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This paper examines the macroeconomic and welfare implications of alternative re-
forms to the U.S. health insurance system. In particular, I study the e®ect of the
expansion of Medicare to the entire population, the expansion of Medicaid, an individ-
ual mandate, the removal of the tax break to purchase group insurance and providing
a refundable tax credit for insurance purchases. To do so, I develop a stochastic OLG
model with heterogenous agents facing uncertain health shocks. In this model individ-
uals make optimal labor supply, health insurance, and medical usage decisions. Since
buying insurance is endogenous, my model captures how the reforms may a®ect the
characteristics of the insured as well as health insurance premiums. I use the Medi-
cal Expenditure Panel Survey to calibrate the model and succeed in closely matching
the current pattern of health expenditure and insurance demand as observed in the
data. Numerical simulations indicate that reforming the health insurance system has a
quantitatively relevant impact on the number of uninsured, hours worked, and welfare.
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One of the major social policy issues facing the United States in the ¯rst decade of 21st Century
is the large number of Americans lacking health insurance. There is wide agreement that reform-
ing the current health care system is desirable and several proposals have been discussed among
economists and in the political arena. A reform of the health insurance system could potentially af-
fect macroeconomic variables by distorting the labor market through changes in tax rates, creating
deadweight loss, reducing the number of uninsured, and raising the aggregate health expenditure.
The aim of this study is to analyze the macroeconomic impacts and welfare implications of alter-
native reforms to the health insurance system in the U.S. The reform proposals I consider here
are: i), the expansion of Medicare to the entire population; ii), the expansion of Medicaid; iii),
an individual mandate; iv), the removal of the tax break to purchase the group insurance and v),
providing a refundable tax credit for insurance purchases. The reforms mentioned in this paper
are building blocks of current, existing reform proposals in the U.S. Alternative sources of revenue
to fund these reforms are also considered. I calibrate my model to the current U.S economy and
conduct several policy experiments in which the health insurance system is reformed according to
one of the above proposals. I ¯nd that the impact of various reforms on the aggregate labor supply
varies between ¡9:1% and 6:8%, depending on how they are funded.
National health expenditures accounted for 16:3% of U.S. GDP in 2007, compared to 5:2% in
1960 (Department of Health & Human Services, 2006). The rapid growth of medical costs leaves a
large fraction (18% in 2006 according to Kaiser 2007) of the population without health insurance.
The lack of insurance has serious negative consequences that include lack of access to needed care,
declining health, and, for some people, the assumption of crushing ¯nancial burdens. Uninsured
adults are far more likely to postpone accessing health care or to forgo it altogether and are less
able to a®ord prescription drugs or follow through with recommended treatments. A 2003 report
by the Institute of Medicine states that the uninsured have a more rapid decrease in general health
and a higher risk of dying prematurely than the insured. According to their estimation the cost for
diminished health and shorter life span due to lack of insurance was between $65 and $130 billion
in 2003. There are also ¯nancial externalities imposed by the uninsured on the insured through
uncompensated care, whose costs were estimated to be about $41 billion in 2004.
These facts have encouraged policymakers to consider substantial changes to the U.S. health
care system. In recent years alternative proposals have been brought forth in an e®ort to cover the
uninsured. Expansion of health insurance coverage has important e®ects on the macroeconomy.
First, an expansion would require the government to increase taxes, leading to reduced economic
1activity (employment). The change in tax rates would be di®erent under the di®erent propos-
als. Second, the newly insured will consume more medical services and have better health status
through better health care access and lower prices (uninsured are ¯nancially charged more). The
expansion therefore decreases the health disparity and increases aggregate health status and labor
productivity, which encourages economic activity. The third e®ect of expansions of any type is
to shift some individuals from existing private insurance coverage to either the newly subsidized
form of private coverage or to public coverage. Fourth, the expansion will also a®ect agent's saving
behavior (and thus the aggregate capital stock and factor price) because health insurance in°uences
precautionary saving motives.
There are many empirical studies that explore the impacts of health care reforms among other
industrialized economies.1 However, little attention has been paid to quantify the macroeconomic
consequences of reforming the health insurance system in the U.S. In this paper I attempt to ¯ll the
gap in the literature by addressing two questions: ¯rst, what would be the impacts of these reforms
on the aggregate labor supply, saving behavior, and health care utilization? Second, what are
the welfare implications of such policy reforms? To tackle these questions I construct a stochastic
overlapping generation general equilibrium model with heterogenous agents facing uncertain health
shocks. In this model individuals make optimal labor supply, health insurance, and medical usage
decisions. Since buying insurance is endogenous, my model captures how the reforms may a®ect
the characteristics of the insured as well as health insurance premiums. An individual mandate
can lower the insurance premium by forcing agents, who are healthy and previously uninsured, to
purchase insurance. While removing the tax subsidy to purchase insurance can result in a collapse
of the pooling in private insurance market and a rise in premium.
My work is a contribution to the literature of dynamic equilibrium model with heterogenous
agents. The classic works of Bewley (1986), Imrohoroglu (1992), Huggett (1993) and Aiyagari
(1994) have set up a framework to study uninsurable labor productivity risk. Many recent papers
introduce exogenous health expenditure shocks into Bewley-type models to add realism. For exam-
ple, Palumbo (1999) and De Nardi, French and Jones (2006) incorporate heterogeneity in medical
expenses in order to understand the pattern of saving among the elderly. Jeske and Kitao (2007)
study the welfare costs of a tax policy change associated with health insurance. A few papers
endogenize health expenditures as investments in health following the seminal work of Grossman
(1972). Suen (2006) endogenizes households' medical expenditure decision to explain the rapid
growth in health expenditure. Jung and Tran (2008) uses an OLG model built upon Jeske and
Kitao (2008) to analyze the e®ect of the Health Saving Accounts on the health expenditure and
1See for example Gruber and Hanratty (1995), Cheng and Chiang (1997).
2individual's insurance decision.
The labor supply decision is absent from most of the existing macro-literature regarding health,
and consequently labor income tax revenues are obtained distortion free. I add to this literature
by setting up a model in the tradition of Aiyagari (1994) but with idiosyncratic health shocks and
endogenous labor supply. My model enables me to compare the welfare e®ect of policy experiments,
changes in the aggregate health expenditure as well as labor supply. Moreover, the model can take
into account important general equilibrium e®ects of a reform compared with previous works; the
distortion of a change in taxes, the interaction between the medical usage demand and labor supply
that a®ects factor prices. My paper is also related to the literature on taxation and labor supply
(Prescott (2004), Rogerson (2007)). In my paper, the government adjusts tax rates to fund the
reforms, which creates distortion on the labor supply. The main contribution of my work is to
develop a tool to quantify the e®ects of alternative health care reforms.
The paper most closely related to mine is Jeske and Kitao (2007) who study the e®ects of
tax policy on the health insurance decision of households in a general equilibrium framework with
exogenous health expenditure and labor supply. However, many empirical ¯ndings have linked
health policies with individual labor supply and health expenditure decisions, see for example
Decker and Remler (2004). Therefore, it is important to endogenize health expenditure and labor
supply in order to quantitatively examine the impacts of such reforms on aggregate employment
and output. Indeed, I ¯nd that the expansion of Medicare to the entire population generates a
change in hours worked as big as ¡9:1% when the reform is funded through a labor tax. Suen
(2006) endogenizes households' medical expenditure decisions to explain the rapid growth in health
expenditure. However, working agents are endowed with exogenous units of labor and supply
inelastically to the market as in Jeske and Kitao (2007). Finally, the focus of my paper is to build
up a general framework that allows us to study the e®ects of alternative reforms to the health
insurance system, which are not addressed by Jeske and Kitao (2007) or Suen (2006).
The benchmark model is calibrated to approximate the macroeconomic aspects of the U.S.
economy as well as the health insurance system in the U.S. From the benchmark model, the
percentage of uninsured, aggregate employment, output, saving, and medical usage are computed
and compared to those generated from a number of alternative models where a reform to the health
insurance system is adopted at the national level.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 introduces the model; section 3 explains the cal-
ibration of the model; section 4 details some reform proposals and presents the numerical results
both from the benchmark and from policy experiments; the last section concludes.
32 Benchmark Model
2.1 Demographics
This economy has overlapping generations of agents who live a maximum of three periods as young,
middle-aged, and old. Let g 2 f1;2;3g denote the age. In the ¯rst period, the measure of newly
born agents is normalized to 1. Individuals alive in period t survive to the next period with a
certain probability. For old people this probability is always 0. For young and middle-aged people,
the survival probability is given by ½(hg), which depends on the health status hg at the end of age g
as described below. The population of young individuals grows at a constant rate n, implying that
the population of young in period t is (1+n)t. I denote the relative size of age g to the population
as ¹g, which is determined in the equilibrium.
2.2 Agent types
All individuals enter the economy with the same level of health ¹ h0, an idiosyncratic endowment
e0, and idiosyncratic health types ih. Health type determines the probability of drawing a certain
health shock "t 2 ­" = f"1;:::;"N"g. The probability distribution of the shock is assumed to be
age-type-dependent. Speci¯cally, the probability of drawing " 2 ­" by type ih agent at age g is
denoted by pg;ih("); with §"2­"pg;ih(") = 1 for all (g;ih). A typical history of shocks up to time t
is denoted by ¾t ´ f"0;:::;"tg, with ¾t+1 = f¾t;"t+1g. Agents are endowed with a ¯xed amount of
time per period that can be allocated to leisure or labor. Agents participate in the labor market
during the ¯rst two periods and receive a wage income ~ we³hl. Here ³ measures the e®ect of health
on labor productivity.2 Health is an important form of human capital. It can enhance workers'
productivity by increasing their physical capacities, such as strength and endurance, as well as their
mental capacities. I postulate a positive relationship between health and productivity.
During their work stage agents receive income in the form of wages and pro¯t ¦t from the ¯rm.
They can also save ag units of the consumption good using a storage technology with gross rate of
return Rt+1 = 1+r. Retired agents have income through previous saving and pro¯t, and consume
all of their income at their last period of life.
The type of an agent is a triple (g;ih;x), where g 2 f1;2;3g is age; ih 2 fhealthy;unhealthyg
is health risk type; and x 2 R+ is their disposable resources at the beginning of each period de¯ned
as follows:
2See Bloom and Canning (2005). They model the human capital of the worker by v = e
Áss+Áhh, where s represents
years of schooling and h represents health. Here we normalize the e®ect of schooling:
4x =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
e0; if g = 1
(1 + r)a1; if g = 2
(1 + r)a2 if g = 3
2.3 Preferences




¯g¡1¦½(hg¡1) ¢ u(cg;Lg;hg) (1)
where ¯ denotes the discount factor, ½ survival probability, c consumption, L leisure and h
health status. Et denotes the conditional expectation with the information available when the
agent is born.
2.4 The evolution of health
I use the idea of health capital introduced by Grossman (1972a). The price of medical care pm
is exogenously given so that each unit of consumption good can be transformed into 1
pm units of
medical care. In my model medical care m can be used to produce new units of health. Each agent
chooses an optimal amount of health expenditure m to build up health capital h. The accumulation
process of health is given by:




where Am measures the medical technology. I assume that technological progress in the production
of medical service Am is exogenously given.
In Jeske and Kitao (2007) the health expenditure is an exogenous random shock. Each period
in time individuals must pay the full amount for necessary health care after the shock, independent
of their income level and current health stock. I, instead, endogenize medical expenditures. Hence,
agents may choose the optimal amount of health care usage to build up health stock. For agents
who have the same levels of health and face the same health shocks, richer agents will spend more on
health care to build up better health stock3. Richer individuals have higher levels of consumption
3Wobus, Diana Z. and Gary Olin (2005) found that the average health expenditures per person with expense
decrease as you have higher income level in 2002. However, the low income has lower health insurance coverage rate
and worse health status. For people age under 65, the un-insurance rate among person in families with income less
than 200% of poverty line is 24.5%, while the number is only 8.7% among person in middle and high income families.
The price of medical services is much higher for uninsured due to the cost shifting (see Anderson (2007)), which
implies the prices of medical care paid by low income families are higher. There are 52.4% people from low income
families who report their health status are very good or excellent, compared to 69.1% for middle and high income
5and lower marginal utility from consumption goods, therefore they will substitute some health for
consumption goods.
Conditional on being alive at the current age with end of period health stock h, a given agent
will survive to the next period with probability ½(h). Death is certain when health falls below zero
(½(h) = 0 if h · 0). I assume that ½0(h) > 0. Deceased agents leave their savings a as an accidental
bequest that is collected by the government as revenues.
2.5 Medical expenses and health insurance
Young agents can have one out of three possible insurance states labeled as in = f1;2;3g. Private
health insurance is in = 1, in = 2 denotes that the agent has Medicaid, and in = 3 indicates the
agent has no insurance. The out of pocket health expenditure will be (1 ¡ ~ q(pmm;1))pmm if the
agent chooses to buy insurance and (1¡ ~ q(pmm;2))pmm when he/she is covered by the government
program. It will cost the entire expenditure pmm (~ q(pmm;3) = 0) if the agent does not have
insurance. Here ~ q(pmm;in) is function that represents the coinsurance rate and varies with the
health insurance state in as we discuss in the following subsection. Agents take it as exogenously
given and it is calibrated from the data. Retired agents are insured under Medicare.
2.5.1 Private health insurance
To simplify the analysis, the only available private health insurance I considered is the Employer-
Sponsored Health Insurance (EHI). Even when an employer o®ers health insurance, not all workers
get coverge. Some choose not to enroll, perhaps because they are young or very healthy and feel
that health insurance is not a pressing need, and others' incomes are so low that they cannot a®ord
insurance. These tradeo®s will be present in the benchmark simulation.
Once an agent chooses to purchase EHI a constant premium ¼E must be paid to the insurance
company, and a fraction qE(pmm) of the total medical expenditure will be paid by the health
insurance company. The premium is not dependent on prior health history or any individual
states. This accounts for the practice that group health insurance does not price-discriminate the
insured by such individual characteristics.
2.5.2 Public health insurance
The government supplies two type of health insurances, Medicaid and Medicare, to the individuals.
person. Taking these factors into account, it is plausible that rich agent consumes more medical service than the
poor agent given the same level of health shock.
6Medicaid Medicaid is a joint federal-state program that provides health insurance coverage to
low-income children, parents, seniors and people with disabilities. The main criterion for Medicaid
eligibility is limited income and ¯nancial resources. I assume that young and middle-aged individ-
uals are eligible to receive Medicaid if their disposable resources at the beginning of the period is
lower than the poverty line Yma. There is also an exogenous probability Â of getting a Medicaid
o®er. This captures the fact that Medicaid is only eligible for child and adults with children. The
program will cover the fraction qma(pmm) of the total medical expenditure. Medicaid is a part of
government spending.
Medicare I assume that all retirees are enrolled in the Medicare program. Each retiree pays a
¯xed premium ¼mr for Medicare and the program will cover the fraction qmr(pmm) of the total
medical expenditures. Medicare is funded by the Medicare tax ¿mr that is proportional to the
worker's labor income.
2.6 The representative agent's problem
A representative agent of generation g = f1;2g enters each period with characteristics sg =
(ih;x;hg¡1;ima), where ih is the risk type of the agent, x is the disposable resources, hg¡1 is
the health status at the beginning of the period, and ima is the indicator function that signals
the availability of the Medicaid bene¯t in the current period. Since all old agents are enrolled in
the Medicare program and leave the labor market, their characteristics simply are s3 = (ih;x;h2).
The distribution of households over their state space is given by fg(sg;¾t), which is endogenously
determined in the equilibrium and evolves over time.
Agents observe sg at the beginning of the period. They take prices as given and make the
insurance decision ing(sg) and choose a set of state-contingent decision rules, which can be denoted












subject to the budget constraint and a no-borrowing constraint
(1 + ¿c)c1(s1;"1) + [1 ¡ ~ q(pmm1;in)] ¢ pmm1(s1;"1) + ~ ¼(in) + a1(s1;"1)
· e0 + ¦t + (1 ¡ 0:5¿mr)
h
~ wte³h1l1(s1;"1) ¡ 1fin=1g~ ¼(in)
i
¡ T(y1) (4)
a1(s1;"1) ¸ 0 (5)
7when young;
(1 + ¿c)c2(s2;"2) + [1 ¡ ~ q(pmm2;in)] ¢ pmm2(s2;"2) + ~ ¼(in) + a2(s2;"2)
· Rt+1a1(s2;"2) + ¦t+1 + (1 ¡ 0:5¿mr)
h
~ wt+1e³h2l2(s2;"2) ¡ 1fin=1g~ ¼(in)
i
¡ T(y2) (6)
a2(s2;"2) ¸ 0 (7)
when middle-aged; and
(1 + ¿c)c3(s3;"3) + [1 ¡ qmr(pmm3)] ¢ pmm3(s3;"3) + ¼mr
· Rt+2a2(s3;"3) + ¦t+2 ¡ T(y3) (8)
when old, where






~ wt = (1 ¡ 0:5¿mr)wt (10)
¦t =







> > > > <
> > > > :
¼E; if in = 1
¼ma; if in = 2




> > > > <
> > > > :
qE(pmm1); if in = 1
qma(pmm1); if in = 2




> > > > <
> > > > :
~ wte³h1l1(s1;"1) + ¦(¾t) ¡ 1fin=1g~ ¼(in); if g = 1
ra1(s1;"1) + ~ wt+1e³h2l2(s2;"2) + ¦(¾t+1) ¡ 1fin=1g~ ¼(in); if g = 2
ra2(s2;"2) + ¦(¾t+2) if g = 3
(14)
The timeline for the generation who was born in period t is shown in Figure 1.
Each agent born at t is endowed with e0. They save some storage goods fag(¾t+g¡1;sg)gg=1;2 to
attain desirable amounts of consumption. Equation (10) presents the individual's after-Medicare-
tax adjusted wage rate. Agents survive to the next period with probability ½(hg). The ¯rm needs
to share the Medicare tax ¿mr with the agent. Hence, in equilibrium a fraction 0:5¿mr of tax is
subtracted from the wage. Pro¯t ¦t will be uniformly distributed to the household as payment as
8Figure 1: Timeline for the generation born in period t
displayed in equation (11). Equations (12) and (13) explain the insurance premium paid by the
individual and the co-payment rate, which vary with his health insurance state. Income taxes are
imposed on the labor income paid to a worker plus accrued interest on savings and pro¯t from the
¯rm. Equation (14) represents the income tax base, which depends on the agent's age. T(¢) is a
progressive income tax function.
2.7 Aggregate production function
The consumption goods are produced by a neoclassical production function. The aggregate pro-











where At is a total factor productivity, and Et is an aggregate e±ciency labor input, which




t ¡ wtEt: (17)
Pro¯ts ¦t are distributed back to households in a lump-sum payment.
92.8 The government
I impose a government balanced budget constraint period by period. The government has three
di®erent types of outlays: general public consumption, Medicaid and Medicare expenses. The
government collects revenues from various sources: income taxation according to a progressive tax
function T(¢), consumption taxation at rate ¿c, Medicare taxation at rate ¿mr, Medicare premium

























where yg is the taxable income for age g agent.
2.9 Health insurance company
The health insurance company is competitive. Hence, in equilibrium the premium ¼E is charged













Notice the coverage ratio functions qE(¢) are taken as exogenously given.
2.10 Stationary competitive equilibrium
Let ih 2 I2 = fhealthy;unhealthyg;x 2 R+;hg 2 R+;ima 2 I2 = f0;1g;"g 2 R¡. The state space
for age g = f1;2g year old agents is Sg = I2 £ R+ £ R+ £ I2 £ R¡, and the state space for the old
is S3 = I2 £ R+ £ R+ £ R¡.
De¯nition 1 A stationary competitive equilibrium is i) ¯scal variables fG;¿c;T(¢);¿mrg; ii)
a sequence of prices for medical services pm; iii) health insurance choices fin(sg)gg=1;2, a set of
state-contingent decision rules fcg(sg;"g);ag(sg;"g);mg(sg;"g);Lg(sg;"g)gg=1;2;3 for the agents; iv)
a state-contingent sequence of labor demand E; v) insurance premium ¼E; vi) distributions of agents
fg(sg) over the state space S such that
1. fin(sg);cg(sg;"g);ag(sg;"g);mg(sg;"g);Lg(sg;"g)gg=1;2;3 solve the consumers problem (3)
taking prices and taxes as given;
102. given the distribution f¤
g of households, the insurance companies choose ¼E such that the
budget constraint of insurance companies (19) holds;
3. the government sets ¿mr, and T(¢) such that (18) holds;













ag(sg;"g) ¢ (1 ¡ ½(hg;"g))fgdsg (21)



















Rt ¢ ag(sg;"g)fgdsg + Y + B (22)
7. there is a consistency between beliefs and the actual prices.













In this section I outline the calibration of the model. Table 1 summarizes the values and describes
the parameters.
Most parameters can be independently estimated. However, there are 16 parameters that
cannot be determined independent of each other as I discuss below. These include parameters
of preference (°3;g;´), the health production function (Am;³), the survival probability function
(a½;b½), the magnitude of the negative health shock ("1;"2), the probability distribution of the
shock pg;ih and the price of medical service pm. Hence, I use a minimization procedure to determine
11these parameter values. More speci¯cally, I pick parameter values such that the distance between
key moments in the stationary distribution of the benchmark model and the real-world statistics
listed in Table 5 are minimized. Formally, let Ã denotes the vector of parameters, and ¡ be the
vector of selected real-world moments. Given Ã, a prediction ^ ¡(Ã) on ¡ can be computed in









The data used for estimating the process of health insurance decision and health production come
from the Household Component of the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), which is based
on a series of national surveys conducted by the U.S. Agency for Health Care Research and Quality
(AHRQ). The MEPS consists of eight two-year panels from 1996/1997 up to 2003/2004 and includes
data on demographics, income and most importantly health status and insurance.
3.2 Demographics
One period is de¯ned as 20 years. Agents enter the economy at the age of 25 (g = 1) and survive up
to the maximum age of 85 (g = 3). In line with Suen (2006), I assume that the survival probability
function ½(¢) takes the form of the cumulative Weibull distribution function:
½(h) = 1 ¡ exp(¡a½hb½) (26)
with a½ > 0 and b½ > 0. The endogenous survival probability rules out the case that agents survive
to the next period with negative health stock.
I consider a yearly population growth of 1:25%. Together with the survival probability ½(h),
the ratio of retired people to active population (the dependency ratio) is equal to 18:6% (19:2%
according to the 2000 Population Census for the United States). The initial level of health at age
1, ¹ h0, is assumed to be constant over time and is normalized to 100.
3.3 Preferences and technology
Agents have period utility over consumption, leisure and health:






12The parameter °2;g is age-dependent and I choose parameter values such that the average
fraction of the time endowment allocated to market work is 0:33, which implies °2;1 = 1:3, and
°2;1 = 0:85. Notice old agents retire from the labor market and they spend all time on leisure.
For simplicity I set °2;3 = °2;1. °3;g, which is age-dependent as is °2;g, measures the importance of
health and ´ denotes the coe±cient of relative risk aversion of health.
The annual subjective discount factor is taken to be 0:97, so ¯ = (0:97)20 = 0:5936. The average
annual interest rate in the U.S is 4%, so r = (1 + 0:04)20 ¡ 1 = 1:19.
3.4 Production of health and health shocks
The health measure h used in this paper is the Physical Component Summary scores formed from
the answers to the Short-Form 12 questions. For people aged between 25 and 85, the lowest
health level is 4:56 and the highest level is 72:17 in the MEPS data.4 This paper assumes that
human beings can live up to 85 years without any accident or illness. We choose ±h such that
72:17 £ (1 ¡ ~ ±h)60 = 4:56, where ~ ±h refers to annual health depreciation rate. I also assume that
the depreciation rate increases with age. Therefore I choose depreciation rate of f0:4;0:4;0:5g.
The transition of agent's health is described by equation (2). Agents can o®set the negative
e®ect of a health shock by purchasing medical care. The productivity of medical care is captured
by Am, and the price of medical care is pm. Both are exogenously given.
Brown (2006) found that uninsured people in California pay 65% more for common prescription
drugs than the federal government does for the same medications. Anderson (2007) found that the
uninsured patients pay up to 2:5 times for hospital service than health insurers. I assume that
uninsured consumers pay a 60% higher price for medical services than the insured, so that pu
m =
1:6£pi
m. This is similar to Jung and Tran (2008). I assume that the relative price of medical service
pm is the weighted average price paid by the insured and the uninsured, i.e. pm = (1¡µ)pi
m+µpu
m,
where µ is the fraction of uninsured in the population. According to Kaiser (2007), the value of µ
was 18% in 2006. Therefore, I pick pi
m = 0:9145pm, and pu
m = 1:4605pm.
I di®erentiate agents into two groups, which are high-risk and low-risk, by using the estimation
procedure of Bundorf, M. Kate et al (2005).5 The health shocks take two possible values f"1;"2g.
For the same age cohort high-risk people are di®erent from low-risk people in terms of the probabil-
ities pg;ih(") of getting the same shock ". The health shocks " 2 ­" = f"1;"2g and the probability
distribution of the shock pg;ih(") are chosen so that the health insurance take-up rate (percentage
of workers buying private insurance per age-type group) and the share of health expenditure in
4As for how to calculate these summary scores, please refer to Ware et al, How to Score the SF-12(r) Physical and
Mental Health Summary Scales, QualityMetric,Inc., Lincoln, RI.
5Please refer to the technical appendix of Bundorf, M. Kate et al (2005) for the detailed procedure.
13GDP is approximated.
3.5 Health insurance
Private health insurance The coverage rate increases in the health expenditures incurred
by the patients. Similar to Jeske and Kitao (2007) I assume that the coverage ratio is a function
of total health expenditure pmm and takes the following form.
qE(pmm) = ¯E
0 + ¯E
1 log(pmm) + ¯E
2 [log(pmm)]
2 (28)
I estimate the set of parameters f¯E
0 ;¯E
1 ;¯E
2 g using the MEPS data. I rank the health expen-
diture and use 5 bins for health expnediture data. I specify the bins of uniform size. Therefore the
¯rst bin contains individuals whose health expenditure is between zero and 20-quantile. The 20%
spending the most on health care belongs to the ¯fth bin. I plug in the health expenditure data to
attain the average coverage ratio for each bin.
The coverage ratios of Medicaid and Medicare are estimated by the same procedure. I report
the parameter values and coverage ratios for each expenditure grid in table 3 and 4. In table 4,
the standard errors in brackets and all coe±cient estimates are signi¯cant at the 1% level. The
insurance premium ¼E is determined in the equilibrium to ensure zero pro¯ts for the insurance
company.
Medicaid I use Medicaid as a proxy of public health insurance for the non-elderly population,
which includes S-CHIP. I use the MEPS data to calculate the acceptance rate of Medicaid Â = 0:6.
The bene¯ciaries of Medicaid typically do not pay anything for enrolling in the program. I pick
¼ma = 0 in the simulation.
Medicaid is funded by general government revenue. The income level characteristic of Medicaid
is typically 100% to 133% of the federal poverty line (FPL) and SCHIP is 200%.6 I set Yma =
$12;000 or about 34% of annual per capita GDP in the benchmark.
Medicare I assume that every old agent is enrolled in Medicare. Medicare taxes are levied
on all labor income and split between employer and employee contributions. The Medicare pre-
mium was $799:20 annually in 2004 or about 2:11% of annual GDP. The Medicare tax rate ¿mr is
determined within the model so that the government budget is balanced.
6Source: Genevieve M. Kenney, Jennifer M. Haley, Alexandra Tebay. Children's Insurance Coverage and Service
Use Improve. Urban Institute. July 31, 2003. http://www.urban.org/publications/310816.html
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I choose a standard labor share in production of ® = 0:66 from NIPA. Total factor productivity is
normalized to A = 8 such that the average labor income equals 10 in the benchmark. In line with
Bloom and Canning (2005), I assume that individual worker's health status a®ects the e±ciency of
labor input by a factor of e»h. Therefore, labor income is given by we»hl, where w is the average
wage rate. I estimate the parameter » that ¯ts the following equation using the MEPS data.
log(LaborIncome) = »h + log(AverageWage £ WorkingHours) + ² (29)
where h is the Physical Component Summary scores that measure the individual's health status
ranging from 0 to 100. I normalize the average labor income observed in the data to be 10:0 and I
calculate » = 0:1393 in the benchmark.
3.7 Government
The value for G is exogenously given and is ¯xed across all policy experiments. I calibrate it
to 27:5% to match the share of government consumption, social security and gross investment
excluding transfers, at federal, state and local levels (The Economic Report of the President, 2004).
This number is bigger than the standard value of 18% because I do not model a Social Security
program and Social Insurance as in Jeske and Kitao (2007). The consumption tax rate is 5:67% as
in Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994).
The income tax function follows the functional form studied by Gouveia and Strauss (1994),
which is given as
T(y) = b0
³
y ¡ (y¡b1 + b2)¡1=b1
´
+ ¿yy (30)
Parameter b0 is the limit of marginal taxes in the progressive part as income goes to in¯nity,
b1 denotes the curvature of marginal taxes and b2 is a scaling parameter. I use the parameters
estimated by Gouveia and Struss (1994), which are fb0;b1;b2g = f0:258;0:768;0:716g. When they
calibrate the tax function, the income has been normalized to the range of [0;1]. In my model, I
divide taxable income of every agent by the maximum income observed in the simulated economy
to get the normalized income. Then I use this normalized income directly in (30) to get the tax
rate. The parameter ¿y in the proportional term of the income tax equals 10% in the benchmark.
154 Numerical results
All potential reforms start from the same initial steady state calibrated to the current U.S. economy
and end in a di®erent ¯nal steady state with an alternative health insurance system. Therefore, I
¯rst compare moments of associated invariant distributions. Then I discuss the quantitative aspects
of the transitions and welfare analysis associated with each of the reforms considered.
4.1 Benchmark model
Table 3 reports the main features of the benchmark simulation. Under the baseline parameteriza-
tions the model is able to match the main features of the current economy in the U.S. The fraction
of insured agents among all young and middle-aged agents is 84:8%, which is slightly higher than
82% in the data. Among non-elderly, 12:3% are covered by the Medicaid program (12:9% in the
data). The model overstates total health expenditure as a ratio of GDP, which is about 15:8%
according to Department of Health & Human Services (2006). The model reports 16:6%. The
model matches working hours fairly well, which is 30:6% of total non-sleeping time (33:3% in the
data). The gross saving rate is 25:8% (21% in the data).
Next, I examine the model's predictions on the life-cycle patterns of medical spending and
consumption. Panel 1 of Figure 2 displays medical spending over various age groups. According
to MEPS, the average health expenditure is roughly constant from ages 25 to 64 and almost
triples afterwards. The benchmark model is able to replicate the increasing pattern. However, the
magnitude of the health expenditure is bigger than in the data, especially for non-elderly agents.
In the steady state, a representative agent age between 25 to 44 spends $5;697 or about 14:5% of
per capita GDP (7:48% in the data). Agents between ages 45 to 64 years old on average spend
$6;783, or about 12:7% of per capita GDP (11:02% in the data). Agents over 65 spend $13;283,
or about 29:8% of per capita GDP (32:59% in the data).
Panel 2 of Figure 2 shows the consumption over various age groups. Fernandez-Villaverde
and Krueger (2002) estimated the life-cycle consumption pro¯les using data from the Consumer
Expenditure Survey. They found that non-durable consumption peaked at age 52 and was about
29% higher than at age 25. The current model is able to generate similar hump-shaped patterns.
However the peak level is only about 13:7% higher than that in ages between 25 and 44.
4.2 Policy experiments
I now conduct experiments to determine the e®ect of reforming the health insurance system. I am
interested in changes in health expenditure as a ratio of GDP, the change in taxes that balances





















































Figure 2: Health expenditure and consumption life pro¯les
the government budget, aggregate labor supply, aggregate health status, savings rate and output. I
treat changes in government revenue as follows: expenditures G, consumption tax rate ¿c, the pro-
gressive part of income tax function T(¢) and the proportional income tax rate ¿y remain unchanged
from the benchmark. I adjust the medicare tax ¿mr to balance the government's budget.
In each experiment I ¯rst compute a steady state outcome under the stationary equilibrium and
then the transition dynamics. In line with Conesa and Krueger (1999), I measure the welfare e®ect
of a reform by computing the consumption equivalent variation (CEV ). I quantify the welfare
change of a given policy reform for an individual of type (ih;x;ima) by asking by how much (in
percent) this individual's consumption has to be increased in all future periods and contingencies
(keeping health expenditure, leisure and health insurance status constant) in the old steady state
so that his expected life-time utility equals that under a speci¯c policy reform. I denote it with
CEV (ih;x;ima). For example, a CEV (ih;x;ima) of ¡10% implies that if the given policy reform
is put into place, then an individual of type (ih;x;ima) will experience an decrease in welfare due
to the reform equivalent to sacri¯ce 10% of his consumption in the initial steady state with leisure,
health insurance and health expenditure constant at the initial steady-state choices.
Alternative sources of revenue to fund these reforms are also considered. I ¯rst consider sup-
porting the reform by adjusting the income tax. I also conduct companion experiments where the
government funds the reform through a payroll tax and through a lump-sum transfer separately.
174.2.1 Policy experiment A: expansion of Medicare to the entire population
In this experiment the private health insurance and the Medicaid program are abolished. Non-
elderly will be covered by a uniform health insurance program, which is sponsored by the gov-
ernment, with premium ¼mr and coverage rate qE(¢). Speci¯cally, non-elderly pay for a premium
that equals 2:11% of the per capita GDP. A fraction qE(pmm) of their health expenditure will be
paid by the government. Compared to the benchmark, 72:5% of non-elderly who purchase private
insurance pay an actuarially fair premium ¼E, which is about 10:9% of the per capita GDP.
I assume that the price for medical service equals the average price for medical service in the





m. The medical technology
Am is constant and exogenously given. I can also consider a case in which the technology slows
down (or speeds up) as a result of the reform.
Experiment results are summarized in Table 6. The top section displays some statistics on
aggregate variables: the fraction of insured non-elderly, the Medicare tax rate, the average e®ective
income tax rate, average working hours, average e®ective working hours, and the health expenditure
as a ratio of GDP. The lower section displays the welfare e®ects of each reform. % w/ CEV >
0 indicates the fraction of young agents in the benchmark that would experience a welfare gain
(positive CEV) if the alternative reform is taken place.
Expansion of Medicare to the entire population achieves a universal coverage as shown in the
fraction of insured non-elderly. The aggregate health expenditure as a ratio of GDP increases by
0:3%. This is because those newly insured non-elderly will consume more medical service and incur
higher amounts of health expenditure as the reform provides them with cheaper health insurance.
The program needs to cover 15:2% of the non-elderly who would be uninsured in the benchmark
and to pay for part of the expenditure of the insured, who pay a premium of ¼mr after the reform,
which is about 20% of the premium they paid in the benchmark. Therefore, the government raises
the proportional income tax rate by 4:5%. As a consequence, average working hours decreases by
4:8% to 28:7. The average health stock of the non-elderly increases from 46 to 47, which implies
a long life expectancy and a higher saving incentive. A decreased exposure to the health shocks
lowers the precautionary saving demand, but this e®ect is dominated by the previous one and the
aggregate saving rate slightly increases by 0:8%.
Although the proportional income tax rate ¿y is higher than in the benchmark, the cheaper
health insurance program from the government is enough to compensate this cost for most agents.
As shown in % w/ CEV > 0, 72:6% of young agents would experience a welfare gain from this
reform, and the average welfare e®ect is in the order of 2:6% in terms of consumption in every
18state. However, low income agents, especially those with Medicaid o®ers, will su®er because the
new insurance program from such a reform is less generous than Medicaid. On average, low-income
individuals would experience a welfare loss equivalent to 4:27% of consumption. While agents who
have income above the poverty line have a welfare gain of 5:96% of consumption.
Table 6 : Policy experiment A
Bench. A-1 A-2
Insured non-elderly (in %) 84:8 100 100
Medicare tax (in %) 2:5 2:5 2:5
Ave. income tax (in %) 24:6 29:4 30:39
Ave. Working hrs. 30:6 28:7 28:5
Ave. E®ective Working hrs. 61:06 57:3 56:97
Health exp. (in % of GDP) 16:6 16:91 17:7
¼E (in % of per capita GDP) 10:1 2:11 2:11
Output 100 97:96 98:06
Aggregate saving rate (in %) 25:8 26:6 26:9
Average consumption 100 97:1 95:6
Average health stock 46:6 46:88 46:84
CEV from transition
all young (in %) ¡ 2:6 2:8
young w/ e0 > Yma (in %) ¡ 5:96 4:85
young w/ e0 · Yma (in %) ¡ ¡4:27 ¡1:39
% w/ CEV > 0 (young) ¡ 72:6 76:7
A-1: Medicare expansion.
A-2: Medicare expansion with Medicaid.
I also consider a experiment A-2 to test whether an expansion of Medicare can improve all
individuals' well-being. In this experiment, the government o®ers low-income agents with Medicaid
and keeps the rest the same as in experiment A-1. Speci¯cally, non-elderly whose incomes are below
the poverty line will be covered by Medicaid. Agents whose income are above the poverty line need
to pay a premium equal to 2:11% of the per capita GDP. A fraction qE(pmm) of their health
expenditure will be paid by the government. Apparently, the tax rate needs a bigger increase. This
can be explained by the fact that this reform is more generous to low income individuals and they
19will spend more in health. However, the bene¯t from such a guaranteed Medicaid coverage cannot
o®set the loss due to a higher tax rate, which is used to supply generous Medicaid program to low
income agents. As shown in CEV from transition, young agents with e0 · Yma still experience
a welfare loss, but at a much smaller magnitude of 1:39%. The welfare gain of higher income
young agents decreases to 4:85% from 5:96% in experiment A-1. On average, young agents have a
welfare gain in the order of 2:8% in terms of consumption in every state. From this experiment,
it seems possible to make expansion of Medicare a welfare improving program for everybody by
appropriately funding the reform.
4.2.2 Policy experiment B: expansion of public health insurance
Policy experiment B involves expansion of the public health insurance, including Medicaid/S-CHIP
(Jonathan Gruber, 2001). Approaches that follow this model generally build on existing public
programs by raising income limits to include many more needy people and do away with all tests
of eligibility except income. In experiment B-1, I increase the Medicaid o®er rate to Â = 1.
Speci¯cally, agents who meet the maximum income requirement will be covered by Medicaid with
probability 1, compared to a probability of 0:6 in the benchmark. While in experiment B-2, I leave
the Medicaid o®er rate Â unchange and increase the maximum income requirement to 300% of the
poverty line. I report experiment results in Table 7.
When the government extends Medicaid to include all agents who meet the maximum income
requirement, the spending in Medicaid as a ratio of GDP increases from 1:65% to 2:46%. As these
newly insured people consume more medical services than in the benchmark, aggregate health
expenditure increases as well. The proportional income tax rate has been raised by 1:5% to match
this spending. As a consequence, average working hours decrease by 1:3%. Medicaid expansion
alone cannot achieve \universal health care". This reform will leave 10:5% of the non-elderly
without insurance coverage. These agents choose not to purchase private insurance because they
are relatively healthy and expect to have a smaller health shock.
When the government increases the maximum income requirement in experiment B-2, some
previously insured agents will choose to apply for Medicaid and at the risk of being uninsured.
Consequently, the insured as a fraction of non-elderly decreases to 81:2%. However the aggregate
health expenditure increases to 17:4% of GDP. This is because Medicaid is more generous than
private insurane in terms of the coverage ratio. The expansion of Medicaid by raising the income
standard requires a bigger increase in income tax rate as it covers another 18% of non-elderly. The
average working hours decreses by 3%.
20Table 7 : Policy experiment B
Bench. B-1 B-2
Insured non-elderly (in %) 84:8 89:5 81:2
Medicare tax (in %) 2:5 2:5 2:5
Ave. income tax (in %) 24:6 25:9 30:6
Ave. Working hrs. 30:6 30:2 29:7
Ave. E®ective Working hrs. 61:1 60:4 59:3
Health exp. (in % of GDP) 16:6 17:02 17:4
¼E (in % of per capita GDP) 10:8 10:8 9:7
Output 100 99:9 98:7
Aggregate saving rate (in %) 25:8 25:9 27:2
Average consumption 100 99:2 97:1
Average health stock 46:6 46:7 46:79
CEV from transition
all young (in %) ¡ ¡0:28 ¡2:4
young w/ e0 > Yma (in %) ¡ ¡1:07 ¡1:64
young w/ e0 · Yma (in %) ¡ 1:34 ¡2:73
% w/ CEV > 0 (young) ¡ 10:96 0
B-1: Public health insurance expansion 1.
B-2: Public health insurance expansion 2.
Now let's look at the welfare e®ect. Public insurance expansion as in experiment B-1, which
includes all agents who meet the maximum income requirement, is bene¯cial to low-income agents.
They experience a welfare gain in the order of 1:34% in terms of consumption in all states in B-1.
They bene¯t from these reforms with a guaranteed public insurance coverage and in exchange pay
a higher income tax. Given the small size of the program, the bene¯t is enough to compensate for
the loss due to a tax increase. This type of reform is welfare decreasing for high income agents who
do not qualify the maximum income requirement. This is because their health bene¯ts are intact
and they need to pay for a higher tax to support the expanded Medicaid program. They will su®er
a loss equivalent to more than 1% in terms of consumption in all states.
While to increase the maximum income requirement makes everybody worse o®. Agents whose
income is below the existing maximum income requirement have the same public insurance coverage
21as in the benchmark. However they are are required to pay for a higher tax rate. As a consequence,
they experience a welfare loss of the order of 2:73% in terms of consumption in all states. High
income agents bene¯t from the reform with a cheaper insurance or a chance of being covered
by Medicaid depending on their income level. While the cost of higher income tax cannot be
o®set by this bene¯t. Consequently, they experience a welfare loss of the order of 1:64% in terms
of consumption, which is in a smaller magnitude compared with low income agents who do not
bene¯t from this reform.
4.2.3 Policy experiment C: individual mandate
Table 8 : Policy experiment C
Bench. C
Insured non-elderly (in %) 84:8 100
Medicare tax (in %) 2:5 2:5
Ave. income tax (in %) 24:6 25:2
Ave. Working hrs. 30:6 30:66
Ave. E®ective Working hrs. 61:1 61:3
Health exp. (in % of GDP) 16:6 17:04
¼E (in % of per capita GDP) 10:8 9:5
Output 100 100:2
Aggregate saving rate (in %) 25:8 26:7
Average consumption 100 99:1
Average health stock 46:6 47:1
CEV from transition
all young (in %) ¡ ¡0:63
young w/ e0 > Yma (in %) ¡ ¡0:29
young w/ e0 · Yma (in %) ¡ ¡1:32
% w/ CEV > 0 (young) ¡ 0
In this experiment about 15% of non-elderly are forced to purchase private insurance, who are
relatively healthier. Their entry into the insurance market makes the risk pool better and the
insurance premium lower. Consequently, the price of private insurance decreases by 12%. The
aggregate health expenditure as a ratio of GDP increases to 17:04% as everybody has insurance
22coverage. The aggregate health status becomes better and the average working hours increases by
0:2% even though the reform requires an higher income tax rate. In terms of welfare, an individual
mandate makes everybody worse o®. Such a reform imposes a higher income tax rate, whose cost
cannot be o®set by a cheaper insurance for high income agents. Among low income agents, only a
small fraction holds private insurance. Consequently they bene¯t less from the cheaper insurance
and they experience a welfare loss at the magnitude of 1:32% in terms of consumption in all states,
compared with a loss at the order of 0:29% for high income agents.
4.2.4 Policy experiment D: abolishing tax deductibility of private insurance premi-
ums and providing a tax credit
Compared with the above experiments, policy experiment D-1 is a market-based reform rather
than a government program. Under this experiment, the deductibility of the insurance premium
for income tax is abolished. Taxes are now collected on the entire portion of the premium and the
taxable income is given as
yg =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
~ wte³h1l1(s1;"1) + ¦(¾t); if g = 1
ra1(s1;"1) + ~ wte³h2l2(s2;"2) + ¦(¾t); if g = 2
ra2(s2;"3) + ¦(¾t) if g = 3
(31)
At the same time, the government will provide agents with a refundable tax credit in experiment
D-2. This tax credit is only given to agents who purchase private insurance.
Experiment results are summarized in Table 9. Removing the tax subsidy in D-1 leads to a
partial collapse of the private insurance market as found by Jeske and Kitao (2007). The fraction
of non-elderly who purchase private insurance falls from 72:5% to 37:5%.7 More than 1=3 of the
non-elderly opt out of the private insurance market and choose to be self-insured. Those are the
agents in a better health condition who face a lower probability of su®ering a bad health shock.
The exit of these agents out of the insurance market deteriorates the risk pool and the price of the
private insurance jumps by 15%. The aggregate health expenditure as a ratio of GDP falls 1:2%
as those self-insured spend less on health. The income tax rate falls as the income base increases
with the removal of the tax deductability for premium. As a consequence, average working hours
slightly increase by 0:5%.
7This experiment is similar to experiment A in Jeske and Kitao (2007). The magnitude of the decrease here
is bigger than in their paper. This result can be explained by the fact that I model the health expenditure as
endogenous decision. The demand for medical services by healthy individuals is more elastic to price change than
unhealthy individuals as found by Bajari, Hong and Khwaja (2006). A model with exogenous health expenditure as
in Jeske and Kitao (2007) cannot capture this e®ect and the change in the number of insured will be smaller.
23A tax credit creates incentives for individuals to purchase private insurance as in experiment D-
2. The fraction of insured non-elderly jumps to 94:2% as the tax credit goes to agents who purchase
private insurance. Consequently, the price of private insurance falls to 9:68% of per capita GDP
and the health expenditure rises to 16:89% of GDP.
Table 9 : Policy experiment D
Bench. D-1 D-2
Insured non-elderly (in %) 84:8 49:1 94:2
Medicare tax (in %) 2:5 2:5 2:5
Ave. income tax (in %) 24:6 23:1 27:5
Ave. Working hrs. 30:6 30:76 29:8
Ave. E®ective Working hrs. 61:1 61:11 59:43
Health exp. (in % of GDP) 16:6 15:38 16:89
¼E (in % of per capita GDP) 10:8 12:14 9:68
Output 100 100:01 99:15
Aggregate saving rate (in %) 25:8 25:76 26:17
Average consumption 100 102:4 98:3
Average health stock 46:6 46:35 46:78
CEV from transition
all young (in %) ¡ 1:76 ¡0:22
young w/ e0 > Yma (in %) ¡ 1:58 0:81
young w/ e0 · Yma (in %) ¡ 2:14 ¡2:3
% w/ CEV > 0 (young) ¡ 73:97 67:1
C-1: Abolish private insurance deductibility from income tax base.
C-2: Abolish private insurance deductibility from income tax base and provide credit for indi-
viduals who purchase private insurance.
In terms of welfare, the removal of the subsidy for purchasing private health insurance is welfare
improving, as 74% of the young would experience a welfare gain. For most individuals, a lower
income tax rate is enough to compensate for the welfare loss due to the lower insurance coverage
and increased exposure to health shocks. On average a young individual will bene¯t from this
reform in the order of 1:76% in terms of consumption in all states. In D-2, A tax credit to private
insurance buyers would encourage health insurance market participation. While the proportional
24tax rate ¿y is higher than in the benchmark due to the tax credit, it cannot be o®set by the bene¯t
from the higher insurance coverage. On average, a young agent would experience a welfare loss
equivalent to 0:22% in terms of consumption.
4.3 Alternative approaches of funding the reforms
4.3.1 Income tax v.s. payroll tax
In order to understand how the macroeconomic e®ects of these proposals change in response to how
the government ¯nances the reform, I also consider funding the reform by changing the payroll tax
¿mr. Now, government expenditure G, consumption tax rate ¿c and the progressive part of income
tax function T(¢), as well as the proportional tax rate ¿y remain unchanged from the benchmark.
I adjust the payroll tax rate ¿mr to balance the government's budget.
As shown in average working hours in table 10, to adjust the payroll tax creates bigger dis-
tortions compared with income taxes.8 Notice I change some policy targets in order to make the
experiment meaningful. In experiment A, the Medicare premium doubles from 2:11% of GDP to
4:22%. Otherwise the payroll tax rate will skyrocket and partially crash the labor market as some
agents will leave the market. To ¯nance the reform with payroll tax requires the Medicare tax to
increases from 2:5% to 7:87%. As a consequence, average working hours decrease by 5:6%. The
welfare of an average agent decreases compared to funding the reform through the income tax
change.
Given the relatively small size of the Medicaid program, public insurance expansion (experiment
B-1, B-2) requires a gradual increase in the Medicare tax. Average working hours decrease by 4:6%
in B-1 and 6:5% in B-2 (1:3% and 0:9% when the reforms are funded through payroll taxes). Again,
welfare decreases compared to the experiments when the government funds the reform through
income tax.
Similar to experiment A, the tax credit has been decreased to $500 in D-2. When reform D-1 is
funded through the labor tax, a larger tax rate drop leads to a 6:7% rise in average working hours
and the young agent experiences a welfare gain of more than double. Even though the tax credit
in D-2 is much smaller than in the experiment when the reform is funded through income tax, we
still can observe a decrease in working hours of 3:3%.
Table 10 : Policy experiments - Payroll tax
8There is no capital in my model. The pro¯t ¦ is distributed back to the agent as a payment, which is inelastic
supply to the individual. The interest rate is exogenous and the demand for saving is inelastic as well. Furthermore,
the tax base of income tax is broader than labor tax. These facts explain why tax labor income creates more distortion
than to tax income.
25Bench. A-1 A-2 B-1 B-2 C D-1 D-2
Insured non-elderly (in %) 84:8 100 100 89:5 84:6 100 49:1 74:7
Medicare tax (in %) 2:5 7:87 11:2 7:81 2:7 5:56 ¡7:77 9:3
Ave. income tax (in %) 24:6 24:7 24:5 24:1 24:6 24:2 26:2 24:6
Ave. Working hrs. 30:6 28:87 27:8 29:18 30:5 30:06 32:67 28:9
Ave. E®ective Working hrs. 61:1 57:73 55:8 58:4 60:93 60:15 64:86 57:5
Health exp. (in % of GDP) 16:6 16:84 17:73 17:06 16:59 17:06 15:33 16:32
¼E (in % of GDP) 10:8 4:22 4:22 10:05 10:1 9:66 12:17 10:5
Average consumption 100 97:2 95:1 97:4 99:9 98 105:9 95:8
Average health stock 46:6 46:88 46:83 46:69 46:82 47:4 46:39 46:4
CEV from transition
all young (in %) ¡ 1:81 2:52 ¡1:57 1:09 ¡1:32 3:84 ¡3:5
% young w/ e0 > Yma ¡ 5:45 4:37 ¡1:92 3:09 0:76 2:89 ¡2:87
% young w/ e0 · Yma ¡ ¡5:63 1:26 ¡0:85 0:11 ¡2:46 5:78 ¡4:8
% w/ CEV > 0 (young) ¡ 72:6 76:7 9:59 15:07 0 75:3 0
A-1: Medicare expansion.
A-2: Medicare expansion with Medicaid.
B-1: Public health insurance expansion 1.
B-2: Public health insurance expansion 2.
C: Individual mandate.
D-1: Abolish private insurance deductibility from income tax base.
D-2: Abolish private insurance deductibility from income tax base and provide credit for indi-
viduals who purchase private insurance.
4.3.2 Changing tax rates vs. Lump-sum transfer
The analysis so far indicates that the change in taxes may play a dominant role in how the reform
a®ects the macroeconomy. In order to isolate the e®ect of tax changes, I also conducted companion
exercises in which the government funds the reform through a lump sum transfer. In the companion
experiments, the tax rates are kept intact as in the benchmark. The government returns a lump
sum transfer to each individual. The transfer is determined so that the government's budget is
26balanced.
The results in Table 11 con¯rm the above conjecture. The greatest labor supply e®ect is
observed in experiment D-1 with a 2:3% decrease in average working hours, compared to an average
4% change when the reforms are funded through the income tax.
Table 11 : Policy experiments - Lump sum transfer
Bench. A-1 A-2 B-1 B-2 C D-1 D-2
Insured non-elderly (in %) 84:8 100 100 89:5 80:44 100 49:1 94:2
Medicare tax (in %) 2:5 2:5 2:5 2:5 2:5 2:5 2:5 2:5
Ave. income tax (in %) 24:6 25:4 25:4 24:7 25:0 24:6 25:2 25:3
Ave. Working hrs. 30:6 30:56 30:6 30:66 31:08 30:81 29:89 30:7
Ave. E®ective Working hrs. 61:06 60:97 61:2 61:26 61:94 61:53 59:41 61:2
Health exp. (in % of GDP) 16:6 16:67 17:5 16:98 17:3 16:81 15:46 16:8
¼E (in % of GDP) 10:1 2:11 2:11 10:1 9:7 9:66 11:18 9:64
Average consumption 100 99:3 98:6 99:8 98:9 99:6 101:2 99:6
Average health stock 46:6 46:82 46:85 46:7 46:8 46:96 46:3 46:78
CEV from transition
all young (in %) ¡ 2:73 3:0 0:25 ¡2:51 ¡0:38 1:75 ¡0:14
% young w/ e0 > Yma ¡ 5:97 4:94 ¡1:1 ¡1:44 ¡0:1 1:59 0:81
% young w/ e0 · Yma ¡ ¡3:89 ¡0:87 1:49 ¡3:04 ¡0:95 2:07 ¡2:1
% w/ CEV > 0 (young) ¡ 72:6 76:7 10:96 0 5:48 73:97 67:12
A-1: Medicare expansion.
A-2: Medicare expansion with Medicaid.
B-1: Public health insurance expansion 1.
B-2: Public health insurance expansion 2.
C: Individual mandate.
D-1: Abolish private insurance deductibility from income tax base.
D-2: Abolish private insurance deductibility from income tax base and provide credit for indi-
viduals who purchase private insurance.
Health insurance reforms that can decrease the number of uninsured (as in A-1, A-2, B-1, C,
and D-2) will improve the aggregate health status even though the e®ect might be small. As the
27insured consume more medical service, the aggregate health spending rises as well. Better health
encourages labor supply as labor productivity increases with health stock. As shown in experiment
C, average working hours increase by 0:7% as average health stock increases by 0:5%. Among the
reforms I considered, only experiment B-2 and D-1 fail to decrease the number of the uninsured.
Aggregate health expenditure decreases as fewer people have insurance coverage in experiment D-1.
The average health stock falls as well. In experiment C-1, poorer health status discourages labor
supply and the average working hours decreases by 2:3%, which is substantial.
In terms of welfare, the implication is almost identical to when the government ¯nances the
reforms with the income tax, but with a slightly di®erent magnitude.
5 Conclusion
I build a micro-founded dynamic general equilibrium model to study the impact of alternative health
care reform proposals on the aggregate labor supply, health expenditure, saving, welfare, and on
the fraction of adults with no health insurance. As opposed to some papers in the literature,
I consider a model with a labor-leisure choice. This is important because a health care reform
a®ects the demand for medical usage, which in turn a®ects the individual's health status and labor
productivity. A reform may create distortions on the labor supply by requiring additional tax
revenues to fund such reform. The magnitude of the distortion depends on the details of the reform
as well as how to fund the reforms.
As policymakers evaluate alternative approaches to reforming the health insurance system in
the U.S., they should consider several tradeo®s: the reduction in the number of uninsured, alter-
native distortions of the labor market, deadweight loss and the cost of raising public funds to cover
government programs. These complicated tradeo®s can only be fully captured in a general equi-
librium framework, similar to the one employed in my analysis. My results suggest that Medicare
expansion and an individual mandate are good candidates for achieving universal health care, while
a removal of the tax subsidy to purchase private insurance would result in a signi¯cant reduction
in the insurance market. For all proposals studied, the aggregate health expenditure rises as the
number of insured increases. Funding the reform through payroll taxes does not seem promising
because such a policy can heavily distort the labor market, especially in the case of the expansion
of Medicare and providing tax credit to the insured.
Regarding quantitative implications of the reforms, I ¯nd that the impact on the aggregate
labor supply may vary between ¡9:1% and 6:8%, depending on the details of the reforms and how
they are funded. In some reforms, such as the expansion of Medicare to the entire population and
28the expansion of Medicaid, cheaper insurance means a better health risk pool, lower premiums and
better health, which in turn increases labor productivity and working hours. However, some reforms
require higher taxes which result in lower working hours, for example the expansion of Medicare
and an individual mandate. Quantitatively, I ¯nd that the expansion of Medicaid funded with
income taxes results in the smallest change in hours worked because the government only needs
to collect tax revenue to include about 5% of the non-elderly into the public insurance program.
Similarly, the change with the strongest impact on hours worked is the removal of the tax break to
purchase the group insurance funded through the labor tax. This is because a larger fraction of non-
elderly (72:5%) pay a tax for the insurance premium, which is income tax free in the benchmark.
Consequently, a lower labor tax rate is needed to balance the government budget.
In terms of welfare implications, an increase in insurance coverage does not always improve wel-
fare. Both Medicare expansion and individual mandate can achieve universal insurance coverage.
Medicare expansion improves the aggregate welfare by o®ering cheaper insurance. In contrast, an
individual mandate may deteriorate welfare even though the risk pooling becomes more inclusive
and the premiums go down as agents are forced to purchase insurance. This is because the govern-
ment needs to increase other taxes so that the newly insured can enjoy the subsidy for purchasing
insurance. The removal of the tax subsidy to purchase private insurance makes agent better o® by
lowering the tax rate, which is enough to compensate the loss due to lower insurance coverage.
Since I focus on the e®ect of reforming the health insurance system, I chose not to alter the
health production sector along the transition. However, as the demand for medical service changes
after the reform is instituted, the supply side may be a®ected as well. An interesting extension of
the current paper would be to ask how medical technology and the price of medical services are
determined and how they will be a®ected by health insurance reforms.
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6.1 Computation algorithm to stationary equilibrium
Given the parameter values as shown in the text, I compute the stationary equilibrium as follows:
Step 1. Discretize the state space S = (ih;x;h;ima;").
Step 2. Start with an arbitrary pair of the steady state values of aggregate labor supply E, tax
rate ¿mr, bequest B, and EHI premium ¼E. De¯ne £ = fE;¿mr;B;¼Eg. Compute the value w.
Step 3. Agents solve their optimization problem.
Step 4. Simulate the economy:
4.1. Set t = 0, there are Nppl agents live in the economy, who are randomly assigned the values
of (ih;x;hg¡1;ima;"g) if young or middle-aged, and (ih;x;hg¡1;"g) if retired.
4.2. Given shocks agents choose whether to insure, how much to save, and how much to spend;
4.3. New period starts, t = t + 1, g = g + 1, the government collects the assets left behind by
the accidentally deceased.
4.4. A sequence of time series is generated by repeating step 4:2 & 4:3;




4.6. Stop the process if the economy enters the stationary distribution.
Step 5. Compute the insurance premium ¼new
E , aggregate labor supply Enew, bequest Bnew,
and tax rate ¿new
mr based on the distribution fªgg3
g=1 according to equations (19), (16), (21), and
(??). Denote £0 = fEnew;¿new
mr ;Bnew;¼new
E g.
Step 6. Find the ¯xed point of £ by iteration. If k£0 ¡ £k > ±, set £ =
(£+£0)
2 and return to
step 3. Otherwise set £¤ = £0 and de¯ne
cg = Gcg(in;ih;x;hg¡1;ima;"g;£¤) (32)
lg = Glg(in;ih;x;hg¡1;ima;"g;£¤) (33)
mg = Gmg(in;ih;x;hg¡1;ima;"g;£¤) (34)
ag = Gag(in;ih;x;hg¡1;ima;"g;£¤) (35)
ing = Gin(ih;x;hg¡1;ima;"g;£¤) (36)
326.2 Calibration
Table 1: Parameters of the model
Parameter Description Values
n population growth rate 1:25%
fa½;b½g parameters in survival probability f0:35895;1:0g
¯ discount factor 0:97
°2;g preference on leisure f1:3;0:85;1:3g
°3;g preference on health f0:05;0:5;2:5g
´ relative risk aversion over health 1:35
fAm;#g health production f1:96;0:52g
» parameter in health on labor 0:1393
"g health shock see table 2
±h health depreciation see text
pm price for medical service see text
A total factor productivity 8:0
® labor share 0:66
r interest rate 4%
fb0;b1;b2g income tax parameters (progressive part) f0:258;0:768;0:716g
¿y income tax parameter (proportional part) 10%
¿c consumption tax 5:67%
¿mr medicare tax 2:5%
G government expenditure 27:5% of GDP
qma(¢) Medicaid coverage rate see text
¼ma Medicaid premium see text
qmr(¢) Medicare coverage rate see text
¼mr Medicare premium see text
qE(¢) private insurance coverage rate see text
¼E private insurance premium see text
33Table 2: Health shocks per age group




Table 3: Coverage ratio for each expenditure grids
bin 1 2 3 4 5
qE(pmm) 0:55487 0:61017 0:65671 0:70503 0:78060
qma(pmm) 0:76524 0:81319 0:85763 0:88673 0:94784
qmr(pmm) 0:49942 0:57952 0:63345 0:69578 0:77799
Table 4: Parameter values in the coverage ratio functions
qE qma qmr
¯0 0:63632(0:00144) 0:83671(0:00353) 0:51344(0:00416)
¯1 0:05444(0:00079) 0:02315(0:00165) 0:03223(0:00266)
¯2 0:00546(0:00371) 0:00349(0:00067) 0:01477(0:00094)
R2 0:0863 0:0475 0:1634
346.3 Numerical results
Table 5: Data vs. model
Parameters Data Benchmark
All insured (in % of non-elderly) 82 84:8
w/ Private insurance (in % of non-elderly) 71:1 72:5
w/ Medicaid (in % of non-elderly) 12:9 12:3
Health Expenditures (in % of GDP) 15:8 16:6
Labor supply (in % of total time) 33:3 30:6
Ratio of retired to active population (in %) 19:2 18
Marginal income tax at 10% quantile 15 20
Marginal income tax at 50% quantile 26 25:4
Marginal income tax at 99% quantile 35 27
Medicare tax (in %) 2:9 2:5
Ave. insurance premium (in % of per capita GDP) 10:9 10:1
Size of Medicaid & Medicare (in % of GDP) 4:6 4:8
Consumption and health expenditure pro¯les see ¯gure 2
Gross saving rate (in %) 21 25:8































































Figure 3: Life cycle pro¯les of health expenditure and consumption
































n Panel 1: Agents Without the Medicaid Offer
Healthy
Unhealthy
































n Panel 2: Agents With the Medicaid Offer
Healthy
Unhealthy
Figure 4: Welfare e®ects of reform A-1
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Figure 5: Welfare e®ects of reform A-2
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Figure 6: Welfare e®ects of reform B-1
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Figure 7: Welfare e®ects of reform B-2
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Figure 8: Welfare e®ects of reform C
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Figure 9: Welfare e®ects of reform D-1
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Figure 10: Welfare e®ects of reform D-2
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